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false memories, but that NDErs recalled them more fre-
quently associated with compelling illusory recollection. 
Of particular interest, analyses of activation and monitoring 
estimates suggest that NDErs and volunteers groups were 
equally likely to think of critical lures, but source monitor-
ing was less successful in NDErs compared to volunteers.
Introduction
“Near-Death Experiences” (NDEs) are physiological and 
neurological phenomena that have provoked curiosity all 
around the world and generated several myths and legends. 
To date, there is still no consensus regarding to the defini-
tion of NDEs in the scientific community, but the phenom-
enon has been previously described as “profound psycho-
logical events with transcendental and mystical elements 
typically occurring to individuals close to death or in situ-
ations of intense physical or emotional danger” (Greyson, 
2000a). These experiences are usually recalled after life-
threatening events, such as cardiac arrest (Greyson, 2003; 
Parnia, Waller, Yeates, & Fenwick, 2001; van Lommel, van 
Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001) or traumatic brain injury 
(Hou, Huang, Prakash, & Chaudhury, 2013), but also after 
non-life-threatening events (Charland-Verville et al., 2014), 
such as syncope (Lempert, Bauer, & Schmidt, 1994) or a 
meditative state (Beauregard, Courtemanche, & Paquette, 
2009). Although the definition and causes of NDEs are 
still a matter of debate, these experiences appear to occur 
during an altered state of consciousness (Greyson & Ste-
venson,   1980; Ring, 1980) and seem to contain recurrent 
components (e.g., feeling of peacefulness, out-of-body 
experiences (OBEs); Blanke & Dieguez, 2009; Charland-
Verville et al., 2014; Facco & Agrillo, 2012). Furthermore, 
although some theories could contribute to the explanation 
Abstract It has been postulated that memories of near-
death experiences (NDEs) could be (at least in part) 
reconstructions based on experiencers’ (NDErs) previous 
knowledge and could be built as a result of the individu-
al’s attempt to interpret the confusing experience. From 
the point of view of the experiencer, NDE memories are 
perceived as being unrivalled memories due to its associ-
ated rich phenomenology. However, the scientific literature 
devoted to the cognitive functioning of NDErs in general, 
and their memory performance in particular, is rather lim-
ited. This study examined NDErs’ susceptibility to false 
memories using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm. We included 20 NDErs who reported having had 
their experience in the context of a life-threatening event 
(Greyson NDE scale total score ≥7/32) and 20 volunteers 
(matched for age, gender, education level, and time since 
brain insult) who reported a life-threatening event but with-
out a NDE. Both groups were presented with DRM lists 
for a recall task during which they were asked to assign 
“Remember/Know/Guess” judgements to any recalled 
response. In addition, they were later asked to complete 
a post-recall test designed to obtain estimates of activa-
tion and monitoring of critical lures. Results demonstrated 
that NDErs and volunteers were equally likely to produce 
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of specific NDE components—such as OBEs, seeing a 
bright light, life review, and so on—none of these can sin-
gle-handedly explain the entire experience and its associ-
ated rich phenomenology.
Blackmore (1993) postulated that NDEs could be 
explained by both physiological and psychological mecha-
nisms. According to her theory, the core NDE is biologi-
cally determined, but the interpretation and details of the 
NDE can be influenced by the experiencer’s top-down 
cognitive processes. These include previous and/or general 
knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about the world. The 
emergence of NDE components in memory could, there-
fore, be related to these processes, leading to a modifica-
tion of the model of reality experienced by the individuals 
(Blackmore, 1993). The resulting memory of this experi-
ence could thus be, in part, internally generated or imag-
ined (see also French, 2001). In parallel, it is now well 
established that top-down processes (in the form of cog-
nitive schema representing activated knowledge stored 
in memory; e.g., a mental representation of knowledge) 
actively elaborate the information, usually to comprehend 
it. These mechanisms have been shown to be particularly 
active in situations of physical or psychological threat and 
when the perceptive features are ambiguous—similar con-
texts classically associated with the emergence of a NDE—
to resolve this ambiguity. Therefore, we may postulate that 
NDEs could be built as a result of the individuals’ attempt 
to interpret their highly stressful and confusing experiences 
(Braithwaite, 2008) to preserve a coherent interpretation of 
the events associated with episodes of altered conscious-
ness. In support of this reconstructive view, the NDErs’ 
religiosity and cultural background have been suggested to 
influence the NDEs’ content and the features’ interpretation 
(Belanti, Perera, & Jagadheesan, 2008; Greyson, 2007). 
Other studies (Ellwood, 2000; Kellehear, 1993; Kellehear 
& Irwin, 1990; Pasricha & Stevenson, 1986) have also 
noted that certain features of NDE seem to be culture-
bound phenomena and this supports rather non-physiolog-
ical theories assuming the influence of knowledge, beliefs, 
and expectations of NDErs. Nevertheless, very few articles 
have examined the particularity of NDE memories (see 
Greyson, 2007; van Lommel, 2011). Recently, Thonnard 
et  al. (2013) examined the phenomenological characteris-
tics of NDEs and compared them with imagined memories 
using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988), a questionnaire 
designed to assess phenomenological characteristics of real 
and imagined memories. They showed that NDE memo-
ries contained more phenomenological characteristics 
(e.g., emotions, and contextual and sensory information) 
than real event memories or coma memories which did not 
classify as a NDE based on the Greyson NDE scale (i.e., 
total score of Greyson ≤7; Greyson, 1983). This suggests 
that NDEs memories cannot be considered as imagined 
but rather as a sort of “hyper reality”. Shortly thereafter, 
Palmieri et  al. (2014) investigated neural activity—using 
electroencephalography (EEG)—associated with the recall 
of NDE memories and suggested that, at a neural level, 
NDE memories are stored as “episodic memories of events 
experienced in a peculiar state of consciousness” (p. 13)—
and not as an imagined events memories. The authors then 
suggested that NDE memories might likely be “hallucina-
tion-like memories of actually perceived hallucinations” 
(p. 13). As suggested by Agrillo (2011), this raises the cru-
cial question as to where and how the brain can store this 
experience. At present, no current theory can account for 
the rich phenomenology associated with NDE memories, 
distinguishing them from imagined events (Palmieri et al., 
2014; Thonnard et  al., 2013), while we cannot be certain 
that this experience was lived in reality.
In parallel, some authors have proposed that reports of 
NDE could be altered memories of real events and could be 
comparable to false memories (Braithwaite, 2008; French, 
2001). Nonetheless, to our knowledge, no study has directly 
examined this hypothesis, that is, whether or not NDErs are 
particularly prone to false memory production. In labora-
tory settings, such memory distortions can be reliably elic-
ited with the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm, the most 
largely used tool to study the production of false memo-
ries (see Gallo, 2006, 2010 for reviews). In this procedure, 
individuals are presented with lists of semantically associ-
ated words (e.g., thread, pin, eye,…) that converge on an 
unstudied semantic associate (e.g., needle), an item called 
“critical lure” (i.e., the false memory). Later, when asked 
to remember the word lists, participants are highly suscep-
tible to falsely recall or recognize this critical lure as being 
a word included in the presented list. The DRM illusion 
is robust to a variety of manipulations (e.g., persistence 
across a variety of encoding tasks, retention intervals, and 
test formats) and has been observed in a variety of popu-
lations (e.g., younger and older participants, patients with 
neurological impairments, and participants of different lan-
guages and cultures). More relevant for the current study, 
DRM illusions are typically accompanied by a compelling 
subjective experience. That is, participants are quite confi-
dent that the critical lure has been presented, and are able 
to recollect details related to its supposed presentation—
a phenomenon called “illusory” (e.g., Gallo & Roediger, 
2003) or “phantom” (e.g., Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & 
Mojardin, 2001) recollection (see Dehon, 2012 for a recent 
review). Dehon (2012) defined this phenomenon as “the 
subjective detailed feeling of remembering that sometimes 
accompanies false remembering of events that never hap-
pened” (p.  51). In the DRM paradigm, this can be meas-




1985). This procedure involves asking participants to dif-
ferentiate between words that they actually recall with any 
specific detail related to his presentation and those based 
on a strong feeling of familiarity. It is then possible to con-
sider a DRM false memory as a falsely recalled critical 
lure associated with illusory recollection (i.e., accompa-
nied by “Remember” judgements; see Dehon, 2012; Gallo, 
McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001; Gallo & Roediger, 
2003), and not as recalled lures purely based on a strong 
feeling of familiarity. According to the activation-monitor-
ing theory (e.g., McDermott & Watson, 2001; Roediger, 
Balota, & Watson, 2001), false memories result from a 
two-stage theoretical process: when we hear a list of words, 
we think about the critical lure (i.e., an internally derived 
word) which was not presented, thus making it more eas-
ily accessible through spreading activation in the semantic 
network. The heightened activation of the critical lure can 
then lead to disruption in the participant’s source monitor-
ing (Johnson, Hashtroudi, Lindsay, 1993) and this word is 
finally reported by the participant if he was not able to cor-
rectly attribute it to its actual source. Whereas an activa-
tion process enhances false memory, monitoring reduces it. 
Nuances of these two processes and their exact nature are 
still being investigated, but they seem cognitively distinct 
(Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, 2001; Roediger et al., 2001; Roedi-
ger & Mcdermott, 2000).
The existing literature about false memory susceptibil-
ity has revealed that certain cognitive and personality char-
acteristics may be involved in the occurrence of commit-
ting errors in memory. For example, Clancy and colleagues 
(2002) have shown using the DRM paradigm that people 
who report recovered memories of traumatic events that 
are unlikely to have occurred (in the case of this study: 
alien abduction) seem to be particularly prone to memory 
distortion. Moreover, the previous studies have demon-
strated that susceptibility to false memories might be asso-
ciated with a personal tendency to dissociation (Heaps & 
Nash, 1999; Hyman & Billings, 1999). Dissociation can 
be described as the detachment of thoughts, feelings, or 
experiences from the normal stream of consciousness and 
memory (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), and may reflect a 
failure to efficiently use monitoring processes or the use of 
lax criteria to interpret experiences (Johnson, 2006). Non-
pathological dissociation can be considered as a normally 
distributed trait in the population and appears to be related 
to how people process and integrate experiences (Farina & 
Liotti, 2013). More specifically, it has been demonstrated 
that dissociative tendencies are directly related to reality 
discrimination difficulties (e.g., Varese, Barkus, & Ben-
tall, 2012). Several studies have shown a positive correla-
tion between the DRM illusion and the scores on the Dis-
sociative Experiences Scale (DES; e.g. Hyman & Billings, 
1999; Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998), suggesting that 
a tendency towards dissociative experiences is associated 
with increased rates of false recall. Dehon et al. (2008) not 
only replicated this association between the DES and the 
DRM illusion, but also found (through the use of a modi-
fied DRM procedure; Brédart, 2000) that this relationship 
was mediated by the (source) monitoring component. In 
parallel, Greyson (2000b) also used the DES as a measure 
of dissociative symptoms but in near-death survivors. His 
study demonstrated that dissociative symptoms in NDErs 
were positively correlated with the depth of the NDE and 
could support the view that “NDEs involve a shifting of 
attention from the physical environment to an altered state 
of consciousness in which perception, cognitive function-
ing, emotional states, and sense of identity may be partly or 
completely disconnected from the mainstream of conscious 
awareness” (p.  463). This suggests that NDErs are more 
likely to have high-dissociative personality traits (Grey-
son, 2000b) and those specific traits, in return, seem to be 
linked to a higher tendency to reconstruct experiences (de 
Ruiter, Elzinga, Phaf, & de Ruiter, 2006). Indeed, research 
has reported memory process changes in high-dissocia-
tive people (e.g., Veltman et  al., 2005). We can then ask 
whether NDErs have certain cognitive characteristics, such 
as higher constructive capacities, that lead them to be more 
susceptible to creating false memories, since these capaci-
ties may induce failures such as memory distortions or 
errors.
To the best of our knowledge, very little is known about 
possible cognitive mechanisms associated with NDEs. In 
fact, no study has directly examined the influence of top-
down memory processes in NDErs. One of the most effec-
tive ways to observe the implication of top-down cognitive 
influences, and memory reconstruction is to investigate 
false memory production, because it allows observing 
memory suggestibility and distortion (Loftus, 1996; Roedi-
ger & McDermott, 1995). A cognitive explanation for NDE 
may be based on the fact that people experiencing them 
make erroneous use of their reality monitoring processes, 
and furthermore that NDEs might (at least in part) be con-
sidered as reconstructions based on experiencers’ previous 
knowledge. This could be an explanation as to why NDE 
memories are then characterized by a sense of “phenom-
enological certainty” (Dell’Olio, 2010) from NDErs’ per-
spective and perceived as “more real than real” (Thonnard 
et al., 2013). Thus, the aim of this study was to investigate 
the susceptibility of NDErs to report false memories and 
illusory recollection using the DRM paradigm, compared to 
matched volunteers. We then wanted to investigate activa-
tion and monitoring processes using Brédart’s (2000) mod-
ified DRM paradigm procedure. After the free recall test, 
we added a post-recall test in which participants were asked 
to report items that they had thought of but did not recall. 




monitoring of critical non-presented lures during the task. 
Our first prediction was that NDErs and matched volun-
teers would be equally likely to accurately recall studied 
items presented in DRM lists, but that NDErs would be 
more likely to falsely recall critical lures compared to the 
volunteers. In addition, we expected to observe a higher 
rate of “Remember” judgements (i.e., more phenomenolog-
ical information associated with produced false memories 
or illusory recollection) assigned to critical lures in NDErs 
compared to that of volunteers, while rates of “Remember” 
judgements assigned to studied items would be similar in 
both groups. Finally, we hypothesized that NDErs would 
produce a smaller proportion of non-presented critical lures 
during the post-recall test compared to volunteers, suggest-
ing less efficient monitoring abilities.
Materials and methods
Participants
The experimental group consisted of 20 individuals who 
reported a NDE in the context of a life-threatening situa-
tion and that resulted in a coma of different etiologies: 9 
anoxic, 3 traumatic brain injury, or 8 other (i.e., non-trau-
matic events such as an exacerbation of an on-going ill-
ness or complication during surgery). A control group 
matched for age, gender, education level, and time, since 
brain insult was also recruited. It was composed of 20 vol-
unteers who reported having had similar life-threatening 
incidents (comparable etiologies leading to a period of 
coma: 9 anoxic, 3 traumatic brain injury, or 8 other etiol-
ogy) but without a NDE. The presence of a NDE was iden-
tified using the Greyson NDE scale (i.e., total score ≥7). 
The Greyson NDE scale is a validated (Greyson, 1983; 
Lange, Greyson, & Houran, 2004) 16-item multiple-choice 
tool used to quantify the intensity of the NDE (i.e., total 
score ranging from 0 to 32) and to permit a standardized 
identification of NDEs with a total score cutoff of 7. The 
Greyson NDE scale assesses core content components of 
16 NDE features. For each item, the scores are arranged on 
an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0 = “not present”, 
1 = “mildly or ambiguously present”, and 2 = “definitively 
present”; Greyson, 1983; Lange et al., 2004).
NDErs and matched volunteers were recruited via the 
Website, publications, and appearances in local media of 
the Coma Science Group (University of Liège, Belgium). 
All participants were native French speakers and were 
screened by the experimenter for any signs of memory or 
cognitive impairment. None of the volunteers had a pre-
morbid history of neurological or psychiatric disorders or 
previous history of alcohol or drug abuse. No incentive was 
offered for participation. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all the participants. The study was approved 
by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Liège.
Materials
The DRM false memory task
In the DRM procedure, participants were presented with 
lists of words (e.g., note, instrument, sound,…) converg-
ing on associated, non-presented lures (e.g. music), what 
is called a “critical lure”. The material contains 12 French 
DRM word lists of 15 items each (materials from Dehon, 
2006 and; Dehon et al., 2011). A female voice uttering the 
words was recorded and digitized. Lists were presented 
in random order using a computer. DRM list words were 
controlled for word length, associative strength, level of 
arousal, level of imagery, valence rating, and degree of 
identifiability.
Participants were also invited to detail the subjective 
experience, i.e., details related to the supposed presentation 
of the item (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Payne, 1998), called 
“illusory” recollection (e.g., Dehon, 2012). To do so, they 
were asked to distinguish memories that they actually rec-
ollect (conscious recollection) from those based on a strong 
feeling of familiarity (familiarity processes) using the 
“Remember/Know/Guess” judgements procedure (Tulv-
ing, 1985). These three types of judgements reflect quali-
tatively different forms of memory: a “Remember” judge-
ment refers to a conscious recollection state (i.e., when they 
could consciously recollect details of the actual occurrence 
of the word), a “Know” judgement refers to the experience 
of familiarity in the absence of recollection (i.e., when they 
were confident that the item was presented in the list but 
could not remember anything about its presentation), and 
a “Guess” judgement is invoked in the case of there is no 
subjective experience and/or guessed responses based on 
its thematic similarity.
Furthermore, we used a modified DRM procedure 
(Brédart, 2000; Dehon, 2006; Dehon & Bredart, 2004) 
in which a post-recall test was added after the free recall 
test. In this phase, participants were instructed to recall 
words that they had thought of but did not state in the 
recall phase, because those words were not uttered by the 
recorded voice. This modification of the procedure permits 
one to test whether the critical lure had been activated or 
not. Specifically, the additional phase required participants 
to precisely establish the source of memories and the recall 
of non-presented critical lures during this additional phase 
linked to a list that did not initially produce a false mem-





The Mill Hill Vocabulary test
The French version (Deltour, 1993) of the Mill Hill Vocab-
ulary Scale (MHVS; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1988) was 
also administered. The MHVS is a multiple-choice format 
test used to assess verbal ability.
Procedure
The same procedure was applied to all participants and 
each participant was tested individually in a quiet room 
with a computer. The testing session began with oral 
instructions regarding the recall test and the participant 
was given written instructions for the “Remember/Know/
Guess” judgements procedure that accompanied recall. 
They were told that they would hear an audio recording of 
12 lists of words and that they would be tested for each list 
after they learned all the lists. The lists were presented in 
random order for each participant and memory was tested 
after each list. The registered words were spoken at a rate 
of one word every 1.5 s and the durations of the recorded 
lists ranged from 34 to 37  s. To avoid retrieval of items 
from short-term memory, a 30-s distractor task (a backward 
digit-span task) was inserted between the learning and 
free recall phases. For each recall phase, participants were 
instructed to write down as many words as possible from 
the list which they had just heard, in no particular order. 
The experimenter strongly encouraged the participants 
to avoid guessing. They were given 90 s to complete each 
recall phase. During this recall phase, participants indicated 
for each word one of three judgement types (“Remember/
Know/Guess”). After having recalled all the lists, partici-
pants were instructed to say if, during the learning phase or 
during the recall phase, a word came to their mind, but that 
they did not write it down during the recall task, because 
they thought that the recording voice had not produced it 
(the post-recall test). Then, participants were asked to com-
plete a French-language adaptation of the MHVS to assure 
that both groups were equivalent concerning lexical net-
work. Finally, they were fully debriefed about the study.
Results
Demographic data
The descriptive data are presented in Table  1. For all the 
following analyses, the alpha level was set at 0.05. As can 
be seen in Table  1, both NDErs and matched volunteers 
groups matched for age (t(38) = 1.004, p = 0.322), gender 
(χ²(1) = 0.00, p = 1), years of education (t(38) = −1.433, 
p = 0.160), time since event (t(38) = 1.631, p = 0.111), 
and their mean score on the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale 
(t(38) = −1.293, p = 0.204).
Free recall
The mean proportions of recalled studied items, critical 
lures, and non-critical intrusions (i.e., intrusions other than 
critical lures) were created by averaging the number of 
recalled words per category across the 12 lists.
A two-way mixed ANOVA that included Group type 
(NDErs vs. volunteers) and Item type (studied, critical 
lures, and intrusions) with repeated measures on the last 
factor was carried out on the mean proportions of recalled 
items across the lists (Table 2). The main effect of Group 
type [F(1,38) = 1.30, p = 0.261, η2 = 0.03] was not sig-
nificant, showing that both NDErs and matched volun-
teers recalled similar rates of items across all item types. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of Item 
type [F(2,76) = 150.21, p = 0.0000001, η2 = 0.80]. Justi-
fied by our predictions, false recall results were followed 
up with pairwise planned comparisons (see Cann, McRae, 
& Katz, 2011; Dehon, 2006). Pairwise planned compari-
sons revealed that participants recalled significantly more 
studied items (M = 0.45, SD = 0.10) and critical lures 
(M = 0.45, SD = 0.20) than intrusions (M = 0.04, SD = 0.03) 
[F(1,38) = 583.81, p = 0.00004, η2 = 0.99], while propor-
tions of studied items and critical lures were equivalent 
[F(1,38) = 0.004, p = 0.947, η2 = 0.13]. This comparison 
between recalled word responses to studied, critical lures, 
and intrusions revealed a “false memory effect” (Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995), meaning that the DRM paradigm 
reliably created false memories in our participants (Fig. 1). 
Finally, the Group type × Item type interaction was not sig-
nificant [F(2,76) = 2.465, p = .092, η2 = 0.06]. Justified by 
our predictions, pairwise planned comparisons were con-
ducted and revealed that NDErs recalled similar mean pro-
portions of studied items than volunteers [F(1,38) = 0.124, 
Table 1  Participants’ descriptive and demographic data (N = 40)






Gender–female 9 (45%) 9 (45%) 1
Age 60 ± 6 58 ± 4 0.322
(Mean in years ± SEM, range) 46–69 47–70
Education level 14 ± 2 15 ± 2 0.160
(Mean in years ± SEM, range) 9–18 2–19
Time since NDE or accident
















p = 0.726, η2 = 0.82] (see Table  2). Numerically, NDErs 
falsely recalled critical lures more than volunteers in the 
free recall phase, but this did not reached significance 
[F(1,38) = 2.569, p = 0.117, η2 = 0.99]. The proportions of 
intrusions were not significantly different between both 
groups [F(1,38) = 0.150, p = 0.700, η2 = 0.85]. Because 
the mean proportions of non-critical intrusions recalled 
by each participant were very low (≤0.04) (Table 2), they 
were not submitted to subsequent statistical analyses.
“Remember”, “Know”, and “Guess” responses
The mean proportions of “Remember/Know/Guess” judge-
ments assigned to recalled items were created by averaging 
the number of recalled words per category and per judge-
ment across the 12 lists and are presented in Table 2.
A similar two-way mixed ANOVA that included Group 
type (NDErs vs. volunteers) and Item type (studied vs. 
critical lure) with repeated measures on the last factor 
was carried out on the mean proportions of “Remember” 
judgements assigned to studied items and critical lures 
(Table 2). The main effect of Group type was not signifi-
cant [F(1,38) = 3.709, p = 0.061, η2 = 0.09], indicating 
that NDErs and volunteers made similar proportions of 
“Remember” responses across all item types. Results indi-
cated a significant main effect of Item type [F(1,38) = 7.967, 
p = 0.007, η2 = 0.17], showing that “Remember” responses 
were more likely to be attributed to studied items (M = 0.40, 
SD = 0.08) than critical lures (M = 0.30, SD = 0.20). The 
Group type × Item type interaction was not significant 
[F(1,38) = 3.638, p = 0.064, η2 = 0.09]. Interestingly, pair-




































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1  Mean proportions of studied items, critical lures, and intru-
sions recalled at free recall test in all participants. Error bars = stand-




proportions assigned to studied items were similar in both 
groups [F(1,38) = 0.001, p = .975, η2 = 0.04] (see Table 2). 
By contrast, NDErs obtained higher proportions regarding 
to “Remember” responses attributed to critical items than 
those of volunteers [F(1,38) = 4.377, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.99] 
(Fig.  2). In the volunteers group, pairwise planned com-
parisons revealed that they were more likely to assign 
“Remember” responses to studied items than critical items 
[F(1,38) = 11.187, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.18]. No other signifi-
cant differences were found with planned comparisons.
Next, the same analysis made on “Know” judge-
ments assigned to recalled items (Table  2) revealed a 
significant main effect of Item type [F(1,38) = 25.494, 
p = 0.00001, η2 = 0.40], indicating that proportions of 
“Know” responses attributed to studied items were sig-
nificantly smaller than those attributed to critical lures 
(M = 0.03, SD = 0.03 and M = 0.11, SD = 0.11, respec-
tively). The main effect of Group type and the interaction 
were not significant [F(1,38) = 0.036, p = 0.850, η2 = 0.01] 
and [F(1,38) = 0.283, p = 0.597, η2 = 0.01], respectively. 
Both groups obtained similar proportions of “Know” 
judgements for studied items and critical lures, respectively 
[F(1,38) = 1.223, p = 0.276, η2 = 0.98] and [F(1,38) = 0.013, 
p = 0.909, η2 = 0.33]. In both groups, pairwise planned 
comparisons revealed that they were more likely to assign 
“Know” responses to critical lures than studied items 
[F(1,38) = 15.579, p = 0.0003, η2 = 0.22] for NDErs group 
and [F(1,38) = 10.199, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.20] for volunteers 
group (see Table 2). No other significant differences were 
found with planned comparisons.
Finally, the same analysis was conducted on the propor-
tions of “Guess” judgements assigned to recalled items 
(Table 2). Results revealed a significant effect of Item type 
[F(1,38) = 7.653, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.17], demonstrating that 
proportions of “Guess” responses attributed to studied 
items were significantly smaller than those attributed to 
critical lures (M = 0.01, SD = 0.01 and M = 0.04, SD = 0.06, 
respectively). The main effect of Group type and the Group 
type x Item type interaction [F(1,38) = 0.526, p = 0.473, 
η2 = 0.01] and [F(1,38) = 1.058, p = 0.310, η2 = 0.03], 
respectively, was not significant. Planned comparisons 
revealed that in the volunteers group, “Guess” judgements 
assigned to critical lures were significantly higher than 
those assigned to studied items [F(1,38) = 7.202, p = 0.01, 
η2 = 0.99] (see Table  2). By contrast, those two propor-
tions were similar in NDErs [F(1,38) = 1.509, p = 0.227, 
η2 = 0.98]. No other significant differences were found with 
planned comparisons.
Production of the critical lure during the post-recall 
test
The proportions of critical lures produced during the post-
recall test were computed for both NDErs and volunteers 
groups across all lists (Table 3). As expected, the analysis 
showed that volunteers recalled a higher proportion of criti-
cal lures during this phase (t(38) = −2.107, p = 0.04) than 
NDErs (Fig. 3).
Additional analyses were performed to observe activa-
tion and monitoring performance rates in both groups. 
The summed proportions of critical lures recalled at free 
recall test and critical lures produced during the post-recall 
test were calculated in both groups for studied items and 
critical lures (see Brédart, 2000; Dehon, 2006; Dehon & 
Brédart, 2004 for more information) to obtain an estimate 
Fig. 2  Mean proportions of critical lures and studied items recalled 
with “Remember” responses at free recall test in each group, NDErs 
and matched volunteers. Error bars = standard deviation. *<0.05; 
**<0.01
Table 3  Mean proportions of critical lures produced by NDErs and 
matched volunteers in the free recall test and in the post-recall test
Summed proportions of critical lures recalled at free recall test and 
critical lures produced during the post-recall test in NDErs and 








 Critical lure 0.50 (0.18) 0.40 (0.21) 0.117
Post-recall test
 Critical lure 0.02 (0.07) 0.12 (0.20) 0.04*
Summed proportions




of activation rate of critical lures (see Table 3). The analy-
sis showed that mean proportions of activated critical lures 
were similar (t(38) = 0.002, p = .998) in both groups (see 
Table  3). This indicates that critical lures were equally 
often activated during the experiment in NDErs and volun-
teers, but NDErs were less likely to recall them during the 
post-recall test.
Discussion
The objective of the present study was to investigate false 
memory production and illusory recollection using the 
DRM false memory paradigm in people who have expe-
rienced a NDE. More specifically, this study examined 
NDErs’ performance in the DRM false memory paradigm 
and compared their estimates of monitoring and activation 
of critical lures, as compared to a matched cohort without 
NDEs. We also measured illusory recollections in both 
groups in this procedure using the “Remember/Know/
Guess” procedure (Tulving, 1985).
Several findings emerge from this pioneer study. First, 
the DRM task reliably created false memories in our par-
ticipants—the so-called “false memory effect” (i.e., the 
rates of false recall of critical lures were far higher than that 
of other non-critical intrusions; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). Overall, the rates of recall of non-critical intrusions 
were very low (an average of 0.04) in all our participants, 
indicating that recall rates for critical lures were not due to 
guessing (see also rates of “Guess” judgements). Therefore, 
our findings replicate the previous research that has used 
the DRM paradigm to induce substantial rates of compel-
ling false memories (e.g., Dehon, 2012).
Second, we obtained equivalent proportions of cor-
rect and false recall performance in both groups. Yet, if 
one considers the subjective experience (as measured with 
“Remember/Know/Guess” judgements) associated with 
recalled items, we observed that judgements assigned to 
recalled studied items were equivalent in both groups, 
suggesting that both groups were also equally confident 
that those items had occurred. By contrast, the subjective 
experience associated with false recall reveals a differ-
ent pattern. That is, NDErs more frequently attributed to 
false recall a “Remember” response that was associated to 
a conscious recollection state to false recall, whereas there 
was no statistically significant difference for the rates of 
false recall between both groups. This suggests that while 
NDErs did not produce significantly more false memories, 
those that were produced were more often associated with 
illusory recollection. The false memories accompanied 
with illusory recollection are compelling, since participants 
are very confident that the critical lure has occurred, and 
are able to give details regarding its presentation, although 
it was never presented. Following the “conscious activa-
tion” account (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995), illu-
sory recollection appears, because people may generate the 
critical lures during the learning phase and later remember 
the characteristics of these generations as justifications 
that the critical lures were presented in the previous lists 
(Lampinen, Ryals, & Smith, 2008). Alternatively, illusory 
recollection may occur due to the integration of mislead-
ing retrieval cues (e.g., a voice that did not correspond to 
the voice that originally produced the list words; see the 
“imagination account”; Dobson, 2007) into the recollec-
tive experience (e.g., Whittlesea, 2002; Whittlesea & Wil-
liams, 1998, 2000). Similarly, illusory recollection might 
occur, because the feeling of familiarity leads to a search 
for details in memory that corroborate the distractors (see 
the “familiarity plus corroboration account”; e.g., Lamp-
inen et  al., 2008). In addition, we also observed that vol-
unteers more frequently attributed a “Guess” response that 
was associated to an absence of subjective experience to 
false recall than correct recall—which was not the case in 
NDErs. This is consistent with the above findings, suggest-
ing qualitatively different forms of memory experiences 
associated with false and correct recall in both groups.
Overall, the heightened emergence of illusory recol-
lection in NDErs might possibly explain why NDErs per-
ceived their NDE as a “more real than real” type of mem-
ory (Thonnard et  al., 2013). Since NDEs are experienced 
during episodes of altered consciousness (Greyson & 
Fig. 3  Mean proportions of critical lures recalled at free recall test 
and critical lures produced during the post-recall test in NDErs 





Stevenson, 1980; Ring, 1980) and that the perceptive fea-
tures can be ambiguous at this moment, processes involved 
in memory encoding can be increasingly active and influ-
ence the lived subjective experience. Indeed, to preserve a 
coherent interpretation of the lived experience during this 
peculiar state of altered consciousness, NDErs’ expecta-
tions, beliefs, or knowledge can influence the encoded 
event and the accompanying subjective experience. Finally, 
NDErs’ cognitive processing style might then lead to a 
highly subjective and very detailed episodic representation 
of the event.
Third, we used a variant of the DRM task to separately 
estimate activation and monitoring processes (cf. Brédart, 
2000). This allowed us to determine, in both groups, 
whether false memory production is caused by a higher 
activation process or by a reduced monitoring process. We 
found that NDErs were less likely to produce critical lures 
during the post-recall test, while both groups were equally 
as likely to recall non-presented critical lures during the 
initial recall. In addition, the sum of produced critical lures 
in the recall test and in the post-recall test indicated that 
critical lures were activated during the experiment equally 
often in NDErs and volunteers groups. This suggests that 
NDErs were as prone as their matched volunteers to think 
of the critical lures and that the monitoring explanation is 
a likely account for the non-occurrence of a false memory 
in volunteers but less so in NDErs. The fact that volun-
teers reported critical lures during the post-recall test for 
presented lists indicates more efficient source monitoring 
abilities than those of NDErs. According to the activation-
monitoring account (e.g., McDermott & Watson, 2001; 
Roediger et  al., 2001), false memories occur, because the 
critical lure is activated during the presentation of the asso-
ciated words in the list or during the subsequent recall of 
those. This activation mechanism seems to be equally 
effective in both groups, importantly, not more frequent 
in NDErs. In the case of our participants, NDErs seem to 
more often mistakenly attribute the memory of the word to 
the list presentation rather than their own thoughts and this 
may reflect a bias in the monitoring of internal events that 
is influenced by top-down processes (e.g., the individual’s 
beliefs and expectations). More broadly, the present find-
ings raise the challenging question of whether (and how) 
non-NDErs also experience similar episodes as NDEs but 
directly (or later) categorize them as internally generated 
events. This would be consistent with the less efficient 
source monitoring processes observed in NDErs here, how-
ever, further studies are needed to explore this hypothesis.
Several speculative hypotheses may explain the height-
ened emergence of illusory recollection and reduction in 
source monitoring in NDErs. We observed that NDErs are 
as likely to encode and reconstruct information (i.e., iden-
tical rate of false memories) than non-NDErs; however, 
their cognitive processing style then leads them to recall a 
greater detailed subjective feeling of remembering infor-
mation that was not actually experienced. One hypoth-
esis could be that NDErs, as high dissociators (Greyson, 
2000b), are characterized by a distinct cognitive processing 
style involving enhanced attention and working memory 
abilities (de Ruiter et al., 2006). The previous studies have 
shown that non-pathological individuals with high-disso-
ciative abilities present an enhanced elaborative encoding 
(Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon, & Van Dyck, 2003; see; de Ruiter 
et al., 2006 for a review). This distinct ability could, in turn, 
lead those individuals to make illusory recollection of such 
a kind more likely. Then, compelling illusory recollection 
may make it even more difficult to discriminate informa-
tion that they thought of from those that had actually been 
experienced (source monitoring abilities). However, further 
work is needed to precisely investigate NDErs’ attention 
and working memory capacities and encoding process of 
experiences.
In addition to this interpretation, another hypothesis 
could be advanced to explain our results. It can be envi-
sioned that specific experience such as NDEs results in a 
change in processing memory information leading to higher 
levels of illusory recollection creation. Susceptibility to 
false memories and its associated rich phenomenology can 
be influenced by different factors. Notably, the false mem-
ory literature has shown that positive moods and emotions 
are associated with higher susceptibility to misinformation 
than are negative moods (Forgas, Laham, & Vargas, 2005; 
in the case of DRM paradigm: Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 
2011). Positive moods are associated with more general 
schematic processing, resulting in increasing the semantic 
activation and thus producing false memories in the DRM 
procedure (Roediger et al., 2001). As NDErs tend to have 
more positive views of future experiences after having 
lived their NDE and persistent positive aftereffects (Atwa-
ter, 2001; Ring, 1980), their encoding process may be mod-
ified after experiencing a NDE. This might then explain the 
observed pattern of results of our study, by admitting that 
NDErs likely retain more general information, rather than 
specific information (Schacter & Slotnick, 2004).
Some authors have suggested that NDE memories can 
be comparable to false memories, based on their beliefs 
and rich fantasies (e.g., Braithwaite, 2008; French, 2001). 
Our study cannot conclude that the subjective experience 
associated with NDE is illusory recollection, but the pre-
sent results do suggest that NDErs are more likely than 
non-NDErs to illusory recollect details associated with the 
supposed presentation of non-presented items. NDEs have 
been associated with a very rich phenomenology; however, 
future studies are needed to know if perceived and reported 
phenomenological characteristics of NDE are associated 




To date, we do not know clear characteristics that collec-
tively specify the conditions under which a NDE appears 
and our results suggest that this phenomenon, or at least its 
associated rich phenomenology, occurring spontaneously 
in the life of certain individuals might be explained, at 
least partly, by psychological mechanisms. One interesting 
issue is whether this cognitive processing style which leads 
to more illusory recollection is particularly active for the 
specific case of NDE memories, and if it is, knowing when 
it occurs (i.e., during the experience or later). Moreover, 
this seems to be sustained over time as reports of NDEs 
appear not to be modified over time (even 20  years after 
the original account; Greyson, 2007). Finally, another inter-
esting issue is the extent to which NDEs memories retain 
episodic (e.g., visuospatial details, emotions, and thoughts 
from the experience) versus semantic (e.g., general facts) 
memory details. Considering our results, we may formulate 
the hypothesis that NDEs memories would contain more 
episodic details, compared to other memories. It would also 
be interesting to investigate whether, in general, episodic 
details are preferably encoded in NDErs’ memory.
Nevertheless, there are some limitations of this study 
that deserve mention. First, the extent to which these find-
ings from such laboratory situations are generalizable. The 
ecological validity of false memories created by the DRM 
paradigm has been discussed (Pezdek, 2007; Wade et  al., 
2007), because memories of word lists are, by design, less 
complex than autobiographical memories. Further studies 
are needed to examine the cognitive processing style of 
NDErs population in the context of more complex false and 
true autobiographical memories.
Second, we must take into account that our participants 
were a little older than typical populations in DRM studies. 
Indeed, partly because NDErs decided to share their expe-
rience belatedly, they are in the range of 40–60 years old. 
The susceptibility to DRM false memories has been shown 
to increase with age (e.g., Dehon & Bredart, 2004; Gallo & 
Roediger, 2003; see: Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman, 1997 
for a review). Investigations have generally demonstrated 
some evidence for impaired source memory in older adults 
under conditions in which recollection performance of both 
young and old population has been equated experimentally 
(Schacter, Osowiecki, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 
1994). However, on one hand, compared to research litera-
ture on DRM false recall, our rates of true and false recall 
seem to be consistent with the previous studies (e.g., Dehon 
& Bredart, 2004) and this limit was taken into account 
when selecting a matched volunteers group. On the other 
hand, volunteers were matched for age, even though one 
cannot rule out the possibility that this may have masked 
differences between our NDErs and volunteers groups.
Finally, another related question concerns the retro-
spective assessment of their cognitive functioning. The 
retrospective design of this study does not allow us to 
say whether NDEs occur more frequently in people with 
increased illusory recollection or whether such experiences 
induce increased illusory recollection in people who were 
previously not prone to this. Although we found an increase 
of illusory recollection in NDErs, the question of cause and 
effect can be answered only by a prospective study in which 
illusory recollection is assessed in individuals before and 
after their NDEs.
Although further work is required to examine cognitive 
performance in NDErs, this study opens a field of investi-
gation and brings out issues concerning the creation of illu-
sory recollection by NDErs. In a longer term perspective, 
a better understanding of NDErs’ cognitive functioning 
will lead to better evaluation of the characteristics of their 
memories and thus, their NDE memories. The challenge 
will be to understand the skills that might underlie NDErs’ 
source monitoring ability and whether illusory recollec-
tion that originates from conscious generation of critical 
lures is associated to individual differences in information 
processing.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the present study showed that NDErs and 
matched volunteers without a NDE were equally likely to 
produce false memories, but that NDErs were more likely 
to associate them with compelling illusory recollection 
(i.e., a detailed subjective feeling of remembering items 
that actually were not presented). Moreover, NDErs seem 
to have more difficulty in later identifying the source of 
information that was activated as a consequence of intact 
semantic activation processes in the DRM paradigm. 
Since the research data on the cognitive processing style 
in NDErs are still quite sparse, this study constitutes a 
first approach toward understanding their memory forma-
tion and, more generally, their cognitive processing style. 
Further studies are needed to examine the contents and the 
origin of this illusory recollection in NDErs. Clarification 
of mechanisms underlying the recall and encoding of the 
NDEs should allow us to complete the scientific under-
standing of the NDE phenomenon and, in general, enhance 
our understanding of memory.
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